First Step Towards Forming Coalition Government
By Tang Shao-cheng, United Daily News Opinion
The meeting between Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chairman Huang Kuo-chang of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) on November 19 became the most closely watched political development. Their dialogue is not merely a political maneuver; it also reflects changes in the new political structure and could mark the starting point for Taiwan’s first move toward a “coalition government.”
The mutual attraction between the two party leaders is not accidental. Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secured re-election last year, Taiwan has faced multiple crises, including disordered energy governance, sustained price pressures, and heightened cross-strait tensions, compounded by repeated typhoon-related damages. Social demand for “effective governance” has increasingly surpassed ideological divisions, with the recent large-scale recall serving as the clearest example. In the Legislative Yuan, although the DPP lacks an absolute majority, it can still block opposition reforms through strategic maneuvers, further incentivizing KMT-TPP cooperation.
From the perspective of political strength, the two leaders are highly complementary. The KMT has a solid local foundation and governing experience but lacks strength among youth and in policy discourse; the TPP excels in policy debate and middle-class mobilization but lacks grassroots organization and a long-term stable party culture. Both Cheng and Huang are fully aware that Taiwan’s new political structure requires parties to find new bases for cooperation.
In terms of political motivation, Chairwoman Cheng is eager to shed the KMT’s long-standing conservative image and reshape a reformist and clean party brand, while Chairman Huang hopes to transform the TPP from a “small but refined” watchdog into a genuine policy-driving force. For both, cooperation is not merely a tactical arrangement but central to their parties’ future development.
Observing the meeting content and subsequent actions, KMT-TPP cooperation has at least three possible forms. The first, and most feasible, is a parliamentary-level “legislative alliance.” If the two can form stable cooperation on issues such as budget, energy, housing justice, and judicial reform, they could effectively control the legislative agenda and force the Executive Yuan to respond to cross-party demands.
The second possibility is forming a joint policy platform, integrating think tank resources and presenting a shared reform blueprint. This would not only strengthen policy credibility but also prevent the DPP from portraying it as a “power trade.”
The third is cooperation in the 2026 local elections. Based on current party dynamics, the KMT holds a clear advantage, but post-election joint local governance could also be an option. Ultimately, the 2028 “coalition government” remains a possibility. If the administration of President Lai Ching-te fails in governance due to diplomatic, energy, or cross-strait crises, the opposition might have the opportunity to form a cross-party cabinet, as evidenced by numerous examples of coalition governments in European countries.
However, the risks of cooperation should not be overlooked. TPP grassroots have long worried about being absorbed by the KMT; KMT internal factions remain cautious of Chairman Huang’s aggressive style and reform agenda. The DPP will inevitably attack the cooperation with narratives such as “KMT-TPP backroom deals,” “leaning toward China,” and “deviating from Taiwan’s sovereignty.”
If the KMT and TPP cannot balance power distribution, policy priorities, and internal communication, the cooperation may again collapse. But having learned from the bitter experiences of the previous KMT-TPP split, both sides are now more cautious. Positively interpreted, Huang Kuo-chang has not aligned with Chairwoman Cheng on sensitive issues such as Chinese identity and unification, which allows for an expanded KMT-TPP consensus among the public.
A larger variable comes from external conditions. With tensions in the Taiwan Strait, uncertain U.S.-China relations, and Japan’s actions under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi disrupting East Asian stability, Taiwan’s cross-strait policy is highly sensitive. Chairwoman Cheng advocates rebuilding cross-strait trust and restoring institutionalized communication; while Chairman Huang does not accept the 1992 Consensus, he supports reducing confrontation and strengthening crisis management. If the two parties can find pragmatic consensus on cross-strait issues, then there is an opportunity to redefine Taiwan’s peace discourse.
Overall, the meeting between the two party leaders symbolizes the maturity of Taiwan’s democracy—the political spectrum is no longer solely defined by blue and green but is moving toward a more complex, pluralistic issue-based politics and coalition governance logic. Is Taiwan ready to embrace a “coalition government”? The answer remains unclear. What is certain is that the Cheng-Huang meeting has ignited new political imagination and opened another possibility for Taiwan: a new politics beyond partisan rivalry, centered on governance capability. This will be the main focus of Taiwan’s political development in the coming years and may be a necessary step toward a more mature democracy.
The author is president of the Asia Pacific Research Foundation.